# Understanding International Prices: Customers as Capital 

Lukasz A. Drozd and Jaromir B. Nosal

University of Minnesota
Presentation for the National Bank of Poland

- Fundamental features of international price data
- Aggregate data:
- Real export and import prices of a country positively correlated
- Both positively correlated with the real exchange rate
- Disaggregated data shows evidence of pricing to market
- export price $\neq$ domestic price for the same commodities
- vary systematically with the real exchange rate
- Puzzle for a large class of models


## Outline

- Illustrate why these observations are puzzling
- Document correlation of aggregate prices
- Document pricing-to-market using disaggregated data
- Propose model with marketing and customers as capital
- Show how model consistent with prices and quantities


## Illustrate the Puzzle for Standard Theory

- Assumes
- country specific tradable goods
- consumption baskets biased towards the home good
- law of one price for each tradable good


## Illustrate the Puzzle for Standard Theory

- Assumes
- country specific tradable goods
- consumption baskets biased towards the home good
- law of one price for each tradable good
- inconsistent with pricing-to-market observations


## Illustrate the Puzzle for Standard Theory

- Assumes
- country specific tradable goods
- consumption baskets biased towards the home good
- law of one price for each tradable good
- inconsistent with pricing-to-market observations
- show also inconsistent with aggregate data


## Illustrate the Puzzle for Standard Theory

DOMESTIC COUNTRY

| Produces domestic goods <br> CPI mostly comprised of <br> domestic goods | $P_{f}$ | Produces foreign goods <br> CPI mostly comprised of <br> foreign goods |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  |  | $P_{d}$ |  |

## Illustrate the Puzzle for Standard Theory

DOMESTIC COUNTRY

| Produces domestic goods <br> CPI mostly comprised of <br> domestic goods | $P_{f}$ | Produces foreign goods <br> CPI mostly comprised of <br> foreign goods |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | $P_{d}$ |  |

$$
\begin{aligned}
p_{m} & \equiv \frac{P_{f}}{C P I} \equiv \frac{P_{f}}{\left(P_{d}\right)^{\omega}\left(P_{f}\right)^{1-\omega}}=\left(\frac{P_{f}}{P_{d}}\right)^{\omega} \\
p_{x} & \equiv \frac{P_{d}}{C P I} \equiv \frac{P_{d}}{\left(P_{d}\right)^{\omega}\left(P_{f}\right)^{1-\omega}}=\left(\frac{P_{d}}{P_{f}}\right)^{1-\omega}
\end{aligned}
$$

## Illustrate the Puzzle for Standard Theory

DOMESTIC COUNTRY

| Produces domestic goods <br> CPI mostly comprised of <br> domestic goods <br> 1 <br> $\frac{1}{2}<\omega<1$ | $P_{f}$ | Produces foreign goods <br> CPI mostly comprised of <br> foreign goods |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |

$$
p_{m} \equiv \frac{P_{f}}{C P I} \equiv \frac{P_{f}}{\left(P_{d}\right)^{\omega}\left(P_{f}\right)^{1-\omega}}=\left(\frac{P_{f}}{P_{d}}\right)^{\omega}
$$

$$
\Rightarrow \operatorname{corr}\left(p_{x}, p_{m}\right)=-1
$$

$$
p_{x} \equiv \frac{P_{d}}{C P I} \equiv \frac{P_{d}}{\left(P_{d}\right)^{\omega}\left(P_{f}\right)^{1-\omega}}=\left(\frac{P_{d}}{P_{f}}\right)^{1-\omega}
$$

$$
\Rightarrow \operatorname{corr}\left(p_{x}, x\right)=-1
$$

$$
x \equiv \frac{C P I^{*}}{C P I}=\frac{\left(P_{f}\right)^{\omega}\left(P_{d}\right)^{1-\omega}}{\left(P_{d}\right)^{\omega}\left(P_{f}\right)^{1-\omega}}=\left(\frac{P_{f}}{P_{d}}\right)^{2 \omega-1}
$$

## Illustrate the Puzzle for Standard Theory

DOMESTIC COUNTRY

| Produces domestic goods <br> CPI mostly comprised of <br> domestic goods <br> 1 <br> $\frac{1}{2}<\omega<1$ | $P_{f}$ | Produces foreign goods <br> CPI mostly comprised of <br> foreign goods |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |

$$
p_{m} \equiv \frac{P_{f}}{C P I} \equiv \frac{P_{f}}{\left(P_{d}\right)^{\omega}\left(P_{f}\right)^{1-\omega}}=\left(\frac{P_{f}}{P_{d}}\right)^{\omega}
$$

$$
\Rightarrow \operatorname{corr}\left(p_{x}, p_{m}\right)=-1
$$

$$
p_{x} \equiv \frac{P_{d}}{C P I} \equiv \frac{P_{d}}{\left(P_{d}\right)^{\omega}\left(P_{f}\right)^{1-\omega}}=\left(\frac{P_{d}}{P_{f}}\right)^{1-\omega}
$$

$$
\Rightarrow \operatorname{corr}\left(p_{x}, x\right)=-1
$$

$$
x \equiv \frac{C P I^{*}}{C P I}=\frac{\left(P_{f}\right)^{\omega}\left(P_{d}\right)^{1-\omega}}{\left(P_{d}\right)^{\omega}\left(P_{f}\right)^{1-\omega}}=\left(\frac{P_{f}}{P_{d}}\right)^{2 \omega-1}
$$

Similar results hold for sticky price models or constant markup models (Dixit-Stiglitz)

## Evidence for Correlations of Aggregate Prices

12 major OECD countries
Statistics refer to detrended quarterly series, 1980-2004

|  | Statistic |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | $\operatorname{corr}\left(p_{x}, p_{m}\right)$ | $\operatorname{corr}\left(p_{x}, x\right)$ |
| OECD median | 0.87 | 0.61 |

where

$$
p_{x}=\frac{E P I}{C P I}, \quad p_{m}=\frac{I P I}{C P I} \quad x=\frac{C P I^{*}}{C P I}
$$

$E P I=$ export price index, $I P I=$ import price index
Data has opposite signs as the standard model

# Disaggregated Evidence For Pricing-To-Market 

## Disaggregated Evidence For Pricing-To-Market

- Chosen OECD country: Japan
- Strong patterns on macro level (all correlations close to 1 )
- Disaggregated data suggests
- Export price movements attributable to pricing-to-market
- reminiscent of Marston (1990)


## Disaggregated Evidence For Pricing-To-Market

- Disaggregated wholesale price data for Japan 1995-2004
- Quarterly frequency, detrended using HP-filter
- 31 manufacturing commodities: copying machines, computers, etc...


## Disaggregated Evidence For Pricing-To-Market

- Disaggregated wholesale price data for Japan 1995-2004
- Quarterly frequency, detrended using HP-filter
- 31 manufacturing commodities: copying machines, computers, etc...
- Domestic Price: $D P^{i}$
- price of goods produced and sold at home
- Export Price : EP ${ }^{i}$
- price of goods produced at home but sold abroad


## Micro Evidence For Pricing-To-Market

- Decomposing movements in export prices

$$
p_{x}^{i} \equiv \frac{E P^{i}}{C P I} \equiv \underbrace{\frac{E P^{i}}{D P^{i}}}_{\text {PTM }} \underbrace{\frac{D P^{i}}{C P I}}_{\text {RPM }}
$$

PTM. Pricing-To-Market

- deviations of export price from domestic price for the same good

RPM. Relative Price Movements

- deviations of domestic price of the good from CPI


## Micro Evidence For Pricing-To-Market

- Decomposing movements in export prices

$$
p_{x}^{i} \equiv \frac{E P^{i}}{C P I} \equiv \underbrace{\frac{E P^{i}}{D P^{i}}}_{\text {PTM }} \underbrace{\frac{D P^{i}}{C P I}}_{\text {RPM }}
$$

- Decomposing volatility: $\operatorname{std}\left(p_{x}^{i}\right) / \operatorname{std}(x) \approx 88 \%$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{PTM}=\frac{\operatorname{std}\left(\frac{E P^{i}}{D P^{i}}\right)}{\operatorname{std}\left(\frac{E P^{i}}{D P^{i}}\right)+\operatorname{std}\left(\frac{D P^{i}}{C P I}\right)} \approx 80 \% \\
& \mathrm{RPM}=\frac{\operatorname{std}\left(\frac{D P^{i}}{C P I}\right)}{\operatorname{std}\left(\frac{E P^{i}}{D P^{i}}\right)+\operatorname{std}\left(\frac{D P^{i}}{C P I}\right)} \approx 20 \%
\end{aligned}
$$

- Volatility attributable to pricing-to-market (PTM)


## Micro Evidence For Pricing-To-Market

- Decomposing movements in export prices

$$
p_{x}^{i} \equiv \frac{E P^{i}}{C P I} \equiv \underbrace{\frac{E P^{i}}{D P^{i}}}_{\text {PTM }} \underbrace{\frac{D P^{i}}{C P I}}_{\text {RPM }}
$$

- Decomposing correlation with $x: \operatorname{corr}\left(p_{x}^{i}, x\right)=0.81$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \mathrm{PTM}=\operatorname{corr}\left(\frac{E P^{i}}{D P^{i}}, x\right)=0.84 \\
& \mathrm{RPM}=\operatorname{corr}\left(\frac{D P^{i}}{C P I}, x\right)=-0.14
\end{aligned}
$$

- Correlation attributable to pricing-to-market (PTM)


## Data - Summary

- Aggregate data
- real export and import prices positively correlated
- real export price positively correlated with the real exchange rates
- Disaggregated data suggests
- export price movements can be attributed to pricing-to-market for more evidence see the survey by Goldberg and Knetter (1997)


## Solution: Marketing Frictions

- Building market shares is costly and time consuming
as argued by Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1986)
- Leads to variable markups and pricing-to-market


## Solution: Marketing Frictions

- Building market shares is costly and time consuming
as argued by Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1986)
- Leads to variable markups and pricing-to-market
- Our contribution
- develop an explicit model in which customers are capital
- make it into a quantitative GE model
- address the question how promising is this mechanism to account for the price data


## Related Literature

- Models with Time-Varying Markups (Dornbusch 1987, Krugman 1986)
- Consumer Search: Alessandria $(2004,2005)$
- Vertical Industry Structure: Atkeson and Burstein (2006)
- Local Nontradable Component: Dedola and Corsetti $(2002,2004)$
- Short-Run/Long-Run Elasticity Puzzle
- Sunk Cost of Entry: Kim Ruhl (2004)
- Evidence: Eaton and Kortum (2002), Head and Ries (2001), Hummels (2001), Yi (2003), Blonigen and Wilson (1999), Reinert and Roland-Holst (1992) (2004)
- Incomplete Pass-Through Literature
- Goldberg and Campa (2005, 2006), Goldberg and Knetter (1997), Marston (1990)

Model of Customers as Capital

## Basic Structure

- Symmetric world with two-countries and country-specific goods
- $d$ good produced in the domestic country
- $f$ good produced in the foreign country
- Composite consumption and investment good
- domestic country: $c+i=G(d, f)$
- foreign country: $c^{*}+i^{*}=G\left(f^{*}, d^{*}\right)$
- $d$ and $f$ the only tradable goods
- Physical capital and labor immobile across countries


## Production Technology

- Production technology

$$
\text { domestic: } z F(k, l) \quad \text { foreign: } z^{*} F\left(k^{*}, l^{*}\right)
$$

- Productivity shocks

$$
\log \left(z_{t}\right)=\psi \log \left(z_{t-1}\right)+\varepsilon_{t} \quad \log \left(z_{t}^{*}\right)=\psi \log \left(z_{t-1}^{*}\right)+\varepsilon_{t}^{*}
$$

## Production Technology

- Production technology

$$
\text { domestic: } z F(k, l) \quad \text { foreign: } z^{*} F\left(k^{*}, l^{*}\right)
$$

- Productivity shocks

$$
\log \left(z_{t}\right)=\psi \log \left(z_{t-1}\right)+\varepsilon_{t} \quad \log \left(z_{t}^{*}\right)=\psi \log \left(z_{t-1}^{*}\right)+\varepsilon_{t}^{*}
$$

- Technology summarized by unit production cost $v$

$$
v\left(s^{t}\right)=\min _{k, l}\left\{w\left(s^{t}\right) l+r\left(s^{t}\right) k \mid z\left(s^{t}\right) F(k, l)=1\right\}
$$

- Let $s^{t}=\left(s_{0}, \ldots, s_{t}\right)$ where $s_{t}=\left(\varepsilon_{t}, \varepsilon_{t}^{*}\right)$ with prob. distribution $\mu\left(s^{t}\right)$


## Market Structure



Foreign Country

Producers

Wholesale trade

- matching and bargaining

Retailers
Local retail trade

- competitive market

Households

## Flow of Goods



## Prices



## Domestic Producers: Production

- Measure one of producers
- Produce good $d$ according to CRS technology: $z k^{\alpha} l^{1-\alpha}$
- Marginal cost of producing an additional unit is $v$


## Domestic Producers: Marketing Friction

- Basic idea:
- customers are capital
- producers can only sell to their customers
- new customers are attracted by relative marketing capital
- marketing capital is accumulated
- takes time to figure out how to attract new customers
- time to accumulate marketing capital


## Domestic Producers: Marketing Friction

- Each with a customer list $H_{d}, H_{d}^{*}$ and marketing capital $m_{d}, m_{d}^{*}$
- Can only sell to customers from the list (a fixed amount per period)
- Marketing capital brings new customers to the list


## Domestic Producers: Marketing Friction

- Each with a customer list $H_{d}, H_{d}^{*}$ and marketing capital $m_{d}, m_{d}^{*}$
- Can only sell to customers from the list (a fixed amount per period)
- Marketing capital brings new customers to the list

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \frac{m_{d}}{\bar{m}_{d}+\bar{m}_{f}} h \text { - searching retailers who become new customers } \\
& h \text { - searching retailers (potential new customers) }
\end{aligned}
$$

## Domestic Producers: Marketing Friction

- Each with a customer list $H_{d}, H_{d}^{*}$ and marketing capital $m_{d}, m_{d}^{*}$
- Can only sell to customers from the list (a fixed amount per period)
- Marketing capital brings new customers to the list

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \frac{m_{d}}{\bar{m}_{d}+\bar{m}_{f}} h \text { - searching retailers who become new customers } \\
& h \text { - searching retailers (potential new customers) }
\end{aligned}
$$

- Customer list evolves according to the law

$$
H_{d}=\left(1-\delta_{H}\right) H_{d,-1}+\frac{m_{d}}{\bar{m}_{d}+\bar{m}_{f}} h
$$

## Domestic Producers: Marketing Friction

- Each with a customer list $H_{d}, H_{d}^{*}$ and marketing capital $m_{d}, m_{d}^{*}$
- Can only sell to customers from the list (a fixed amount per period)
- Marketing capital brings new customers to the list

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \frac{m_{d}}{\bar{m}_{d}+\bar{m}_{f}} h \text { - searching retailers who become new customers } \\
& h \text { - searching retailers (potential new customers) }
\end{aligned}
$$

- Customer list evolves according to the law

$$
H_{d}=\left(1-\delta_{H}\right) H_{d,-1}+\frac{m_{d}}{\bar{m}_{d}+\bar{m}_{f}} h
$$

- Marketing capital evolves according to the law

$$
m_{d}=\left(1-\delta_{m}\right) m_{d,-1}+a_{d}-\phi m_{d,-1}\left(\frac{a_{d}}{m_{d,-1}}-\delta_{m}\right)^{2}
$$

## Domestic Producers: Marketing Friction

- Each with a customer list $H_{d}, H_{d}^{*}$ and marketing capital $m_{d}, m_{d}^{*}$
- Can only sell to customers from the list (a fixed amount per period)
- Marketing capital brings new customers to the list

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \frac{m_{d}}{\bar{m}_{d}+\bar{m}_{f}} h \text { - searching retailers who become new customers } \\
& h \text { - searching retailers (potential new customers) }
\end{aligned}
$$

- Customer list evolves according to the law ( $H_{d,-1}$ - state variable)

$$
H_{d}=\left(1-\delta_{H}\right) H_{d,-1}+\frac{m_{d}}{\bar{m}_{d}+\bar{m}_{f}} h
$$

- Marketing capital evolves according to the law ( $m_{d,-1}$ - state variable)

$$
m_{d}=\left(1-\delta_{m}\right) m_{d,-1}+a_{d}-\phi m_{d,-1}\left(\frac{a_{d}}{m_{d,-1}}-\delta_{m}\right)^{2}
$$

## Domestic Producers: Profit Maximization

- Maximize expected present value of $\Pi$

$$
\Pi=\left(p_{d}-v\right) d+\left(x p_{d}^{*}-v\right) d^{*}-v a_{d}-x v^{*} a_{d}^{*}
$$

subject to

- sales constraints

$$
d \leq H_{d}
$$

- laws of motion

$$
\begin{gathered}
H_{d}=\left(1-\delta_{H}\right) H_{d,-1}+\frac{m_{d}}{\bar{m}_{d}+\bar{m}_{f}} h \\
m_{d}=\left(1-\delta_{m}\right) m_{d,-1}+a_{d}-\phi m_{d,-1}\left(\frac{a_{d}}{m_{d,-1}}-\delta_{m}\right)^{2}
\end{gathered}
$$

- analogous constraints apply in the foreign market


## Retailers: Search Technology

- Search to match with producers (at cost $\chi v$ )
- meet local producer with probability $\pi$
- meet foreign producer with probability $1-\pi$
- The match gives opportunity to trade one unit of output per period
- The match dissolves with per period probability $\delta_{H}$


## Retailers: Search Technology

- Search to match with producers (at cost $\chi v$ )
- meet local producer with probability $\pi=\frac{\bar{m}_{d}}{\bar{m}_{d}+\bar{m}_{f}}$
- meet foreign producer with probability $1-\pi=\frac{\bar{m}_{f}}{\bar{m}_{d}+\bar{m}_{f}}$
- The match gives opportunity to trade one unit of output per period
- The match dissolves with per period probability $\delta_{H}$


## Retailers: Equilibrium Measure $h$

- Measure of searching retailers $h$ is endogenously determined by

$$
\pi V_{d}+(1-\pi) V_{f} \leq \chi v \quad \text { with ' }=\text { ' whenever } h>0
$$

where:

$$
\begin{aligned}
& V_{d}=\max \left\{0, P_{d}-p_{d}\right\}+\left(1-\delta_{H}\right) E_{t}\left[Q V_{d}^{\prime}\right] \\
& V_{f}=\max \left\{0, P_{f}-p_{f}\right\}+\left(1-\delta_{H}\right) E_{t}\left[Q V_{f}^{\prime}\right]
\end{aligned}
$$

## Bargaining and Wholesale Prices

- Producer \& retailer bargain for the wholesale price $p_{d}$ (or $p_{f}$ )
- At each history $s^{t}$ prices satisfy the Nash Bargaining problem

$$
p_{d}\left(s^{t}\right) \in \operatorname{argmax}_{p}\left\{J_{d}\left(s^{t} ; p\right)^{\theta} V_{d}\left(s^{t} ; p\right)^{1-\theta}\right\}
$$

where

$$
J_{d}\left(s^{t} ; p\right)=\max \left\{0, p-v\left(s^{t}\right)\right\}+\left(1-\delta_{H}\right) E_{t} Q\left(s^{t+1} \mid s^{t}\right) J_{d}\left(s^{t+1} ; p_{d}\left(s^{t+1}\right)\right)
$$

- value from the match for the producer

$$
V_{d}\left(s^{t} ; p\right)=\max \left\{0, P_{d}\left(s^{t}\right)-p\right\}+\left(1-\delta_{H}\right) E_{t} Q\left(s^{t+1} \mid s^{t}\right) V_{d}\left(s^{t+1} ; p_{d}\left(s^{t+1}\right)\right)
$$

- value from the match for the retailer


## Bargaining and Wholesale Prices

## Proposition

The solution results in instantaneous surplus splitting

$$
\begin{gathered}
p_{d}=\theta P_{d}+(1-\theta) v \\
p_{f}=\theta P_{f}+(1-\theta) x v^{*}
\end{gathered}
$$

## Bargaining and Wholesale Prices

## Proposition

The solution results in instantaneous surplus splitting

$$
\begin{gathered}
p_{d}=\theta P_{d}+(1-\theta) v \\
p_{f}=\theta P_{f}+(1-\theta) x v^{*}
\end{gathered}
$$

- Intuition:
- from tomorrow on the trade surplus is split in proportion $\theta, 1-\theta$
- from today on the trade surplus is split in proportion $\theta, 1-\theta$
- Implication: today's instantaneous surplus must be split the same way


## Households

- Maximize $E_{t} \sum_{t=0}^{\infty} \beta^{t} u(c, 1-l)$
subject to
- Armington aggregation

$$
c+i=G(d, f)=\left(\omega d^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}+(1-\omega) f^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}\right)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}}
$$

- law of motion for physical capital

$$
k\left(s^{t}\right)=(1-\delta) k\left(s^{t-1}\right)+i
$$

- standard budget constraint under complete markets

$$
P_{d} d+P_{f} f+\int_{S} Q\left(s_{t+1} \mid s^{t}\right) b\left(s_{t+1} \mid s^{t}\right) \mu\left(d s_{t+1}\right)=b\left(s^{t}\right)+w l+r k\left(s^{t-1}\right)+\Pi
$$

- Numeraire normalization: price of final good is one


## Equilibrium Feasibility

- Meeting probability consistency condition

$$
\pi=\frac{\bar{m}_{d}}{\bar{m}_{d}+\bar{m}_{f}}
$$

- Representativeness $m_{d}=\bar{m}_{d}, m_{f}=\bar{m}_{f}$
- Production feasibility $d+d^{*}+a_{d}+a_{f}+\chi h=z F(k, l)$
- Definition of equilibrium is standard


# Intuition and Qualitative Features 

## Parameterization: Qualitative Features

- Model parameters are such that
- domestic and foreign goods close substitutes
- market shares are sluggish in the short-run
- Justified by:
- short-run vs. long-run elasticity puzzle (see Ruhl 2004)
- trade unresponsive to price changes in time-series
- trade responsive to price changes in the long-run
- pattern inconsistent with the standard theory


## Primitive Shock



Positive productivity shock in domestic country

## Failure of the Standard Model



## Success of Our Model



## Key Feature: Producers Price To Market



Markup on exported goods goes up when real exchange rate depreciates

## Why Do Producers Price To Market?


$p_{x}=\theta x P_{d}^{*}+(1-\theta) v$
$x P_{d}^{*}>P_{d}$
$p_{d}=\theta P_{d}+(1-\theta) v$
$p_{x}>p_{d}-$ not arbitraged away due to marketing friction

## Why $x P_{d}^{*}$ rises relative to $P_{d}$ ?

A. Retail prices $\left(P_{d}^{*}, P_{d}\right)$ change slowly and little
B. Real exchange rate $x$ depreciates: $x P_{d}^{*}$ goes up relative to $P_{d}$

## Why $x P_{d}^{*}$ rises relative to $P_{d}$ ?

## A. Retail Prices Change Slowly and Little

- Retail prices depend on relative supply of domestic to foreign goods

$$
P_{d}=\omega\left[\omega+(1-\omega) \frac{f}{d}^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}\right]^{\frac{1}{\gamma-1}}
$$

- Relative supply sluggish due to sluggish market shares in the S-R

$$
\frac{f}{d}=\frac{H_{f}}{H_{d}}=\frac{\left(1-\delta_{H}\right) H_{f,-1}+\frac{\bar{m}_{f}}{\bar{m}_{d}+\bar{m}_{f}} h}{\left(1-\delta_{H}\right) H_{d,-1}+\frac{\bar{m}_{d}}{\overline{\bar{m}_{d}+\bar{m}_{f}}} h}
$$

- Domestic and foreign goods closely substitutable (high $\gamma$ )


## Why $x P_{d}^{*}$ rises relatively to $P_{d}$ ?

B. Real Exchange Rate Depreciates

- Real exchange rate determined by efficient risk sharing

$$
x=\frac{u_{c}\left(c^{*}, 1-l^{*}\right)}{u_{c}(c, 1-l)}
$$

- Shock makes consumption at home rise more then abroad
- Domestic producers have relatively larger market share at home
- at home it is relatively easy to find domestic goods
- Market shares are sluggish in the S-R due to marketing friction
- at home retailers search harder
- most of increased output stays at home


## Recap



- Retail prices sluggish
- Real exchange rate depreciates: $x P_{d}^{*}>P_{d}$
- Bargaining leads to $p_{x}>p_{d}$
- Marketing frictions make $p_{x}>p_{d}$ sustainable in S-R


## Contrast with the Literature

- Time varying markups in the literature (e.g. Atkeson and Burstein (2005))
- permanent shocks have permanent effects
- static friction
- same S-R and L-R dynamics
- This paper:
- permanent shocks have no long-run effects
- dynamic friction
- S-R and L-R dynamics differ


# Parameterization 

## Quantitative Discipline

- Account for the short run vs. long run price elasticity puzzle
- trade responsive to tariff reductions in the long run
- trade unresponsive to price fluctuations in time-series


## Quantitative Discipline

- Account for the short run vs. long run price elasticity puzzle
- trade responsive to tariff reductions in the long run
- price elasticity of trade high $\approx 8$
- trade unresponsive to price fluctuations in time-series
- price elasticity of trade low $\approx 1$


## Quantitative Discipline

- Account for the short run vs. long run price elasticity puzzle
- trade responsive to tariff reductions in the long run
- price elasticity of trade high $\approx 8$
- trade unresponsive to price fluctuations in time-series
- price elasticity of trade low $\approx 1$
- Pins down two parameters:
- elasticity of substitution in preferences: $\gamma$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& G(d, f)=\left(\omega d^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}+(1-\omega) f^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}\right)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}} \\
& -\gamma=8 \text { gives high 'long-run elasticity' }
\end{aligned}
$$

- market expansion friction: $\phi$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& m_{d}=\left(1-\delta_{m}\right) m_{d,-1}+a_{d}-\phi\left(\frac{a_{d}}{m_{d,-1}}-\delta_{m}\right)^{2} m_{d,-1} \\
& -\phi \text { gives low 'short-run elasticity' }
\end{aligned}
$$

## Details: Market Expansion Friction $\phi$

$$
m_{d}=\left(1-\delta_{m}\right) m_{d,-1}+a_{d}-\phi m_{d,-1}\left(\frac{a_{d}}{m_{d,-1}}-\delta_{m}\right)^{2}
$$

- Set jointly with other parameters to match
- our measure of 'short-run empirical elasticity of substitution'

$$
\text { volatility ratio: } \sigma\left(\frac{D A}{f}\right) / \sigma\left(\frac{p_{f}}{P_{D A}}\right) \approx 0.81(16 \mathrm{OECD})
$$

where: $D A$ - domestic absorption in constant prices
$f$ - imports in constant prices
$p_{f}$ - deflator price of imports
$P_{D A}$ - deflator price of domestic absorption

- Theoretical justification: in the frictionless model volatility ratio is $\gamma$


## Parameterization - Overview

- Step 1: Select the following parameters independently

$$
\gamma=7.9, \beta=0.99, \alpha=0.36, \sigma=2, \delta=0.025, \delta_{H}=0.1 \text { (arbitrary) }
$$

- Step 2: Select remaining parameters jointly

$$
\phi=4.35, \delta_{m}=0.016, \theta=0.42, \chi=1.3, \eta=0.34, \omega=0.55
$$

to hit the following targets from the data

| Data Target | Value |
| :--- | :--- |
| 1. Import to GDP | $12 \%$ |
| 2. Producer markups | $10 \%$ |
| 3. Volatility of $p_{x}$ relative to $x$ | $37 \%$ |
| 4. Volatility ratio | 0.81 |
| 5. Market activities in time endowment | $30 \%$ |
| 6. Share of marketing expenditures in GDP | $4.5 \%$ |

## Quantitative Results

## Quantitative Results

- State results and contrast with standard theory
- Benchmark ( $\gamma=7.9, \phi=4.35$ )
- Standard model ( $\gamma=0.81$, no $\phi)$
- worse statistics for international prices
- subject to long-run/short-run elasticity puzzle
- similar statistics for quantities


## Results: International Prices

|  | Model Economies |
| :--- | :--- |
|  | Benchmark |
| STATISTIC | $\gamma=7.9$ |
|  | DATA |
|  |  |

A. Correlations

| $p_{x}, p_{m}$ | 0.75 | 1.00 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $p_{x}, x$ | 0.46 | 1.00 |
| $p_{m}, x$ | 0.69 | 1.00 |

B. Volatility relative to $x$

| $p_{x}$ | 0.37 | 0.37 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $p_{m}$ | 0.61 | 0.63 |
| $p$ | $0.26^{*}$ | 0.27 |

## Results: International Prices

|  | Model Economies |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  | Benchmark | Standard |
| STATISTIC | $\gamma=7.9$ | $\gamma=0.81$ |

A. Correlations

| $p_{x}, p_{m}$ | 0.75 | 1.00 | -1.00 |
| :--- | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| $p_{x}, x$ | 0.46 | 1.00 | -1.00 |
| $p_{m}, x$ | 0.69 | 1.00 | 1.00 |

B. Volatility relative to $x$

| $p_{x}$ | 0.37 | 0.37 | 0.13 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $p_{m}$ | 0.61 | 0.63 | 1.13 |
| $p$ | $0.26^{*}$ | 0.27 | 1.26 |

## Results: International Prices

|  |  | MoDEL ECONOMIES |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  |  | Benchmark <br> $\gamma=7.9$ | Standard <br>  <br>  <br> STATISTIC |
|  | DATA | $\gamma=0.81$ <br> A. Correlations |  |
| $p_{x}, p_{m}$ |  |  |  |
| $p_{x}, x$ | 0.75 | 1.00 | -1.00 |
| $p_{m}, x$ | 0.46 | 1.00 | -1.00 |
| B. Volatility relative to $x$ |  |  | 1.00 |
| $p_{x}$ | 0.69 | 1.00 |  |
| $p_{m}$ | 0.37 | 0.37 | 0.13 |
| $p$ | 0.61 | 0.63 | 1.13 |

Both models fall short in terms of volatility of $x$ !

## Results: Short-Run vs Long-Run Elasticity Puzzle

|  |  | MoDEL ECONOMIES |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  |  | Benchmark <br> $\gamma=7.9$ <br> STATISTIC |
| Long-Run <br> Elasticity | DATA | $\phi=4.35$ |
| Volatility <br> Ratio | 7.90 | 7.90 |

## Results: Short-Run vs Long-Run Elasticity Puzzle

|  |  | MoDEL ECONOMIES |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  |  | Benchmark | Standard |
|  | DATA | $\phi=7.9$ | $\gamma=0.81$ |
| Statistic | 7.90 | 7.90 | no $\phi$ |
| Long-Run <br> Elasticity | 0.81 | 0.81 | 0.81 |
| Volatility <br> Ratio |  |  |  |

## Results: Quantities

|  |  | Model EcOnOMIES |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
|  |  | Benchmark <br> $\gamma=7.9$ |
| STATISTIC | DATA | $\phi=4.35$ |
| A. International Comovement |  |  |
| Output | 0.40 | 0.40 |
| Consumption | 0.25 | 0.32 |
| Investment | 0.23 | 0.02 |
| Employment | 0.21 | 0.42 |
| B. Volatility relative to | $G D P$ |  |
| Consumption | 0.74 | 0.38 |
| Investment | 2.79 | 3.51 |
| Employment | 0.81 | 0.56 |
| Net Exports | 0.30 | 0.19 |

## Results: Quantities

## STATISTIC

Model Economies
Benchmark Standard
$\gamma=7.9 \quad \gamma=0.81$
DATA $\quad \phi=4.35 \quad$ no $\phi$
A. International Comovement

| Output | 0.40 | 0.40 | 0.29 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Consumption | 0.25 | 0.32 | 0.30 |
| Investment | 0.23 | 0.02 | 0.11 |
| Employment | 0.21 | 0.42 | 0.40 |

B. Volatility relative to $G D P$

| Consumption | 0.74 | 0.38 | 0.30 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Investment | 2.79 | 3.51 | 3.35 |
| Employment | 0.81 | 0.56 | 0.49 |
| Net Exports | 0.30 | 0.19 | 0.15 |

## Comparison to Disaggregated Data

- Consider our previous decomposition:

$$
p_{x}^{i} \equiv \frac{E P^{i}}{C P I} \equiv \underbrace{\frac{E P^{i}}{D P^{i}}}_{\mathrm{PTM}} \underbrace{\frac{D P^{i}}{C P I}}_{\mathrm{RPM}}
$$

- Volatility of $p_{x}^{i}$ relative to $x$ :
- Data : $80 \%$ from PTM
- Benchmark : 78\% from PTM
- Correlation with $x$ :
- Data
: PTM = 0.84
$R P M=-0.14$
- Benchmark : PTM $=1.00 \quad$ RPM $=-1.00$


## Comparison to Disaggregated Data

- Consider our previous decomposition:

$$
p_{x}^{i} \equiv \frac{E P^{i}}{C P I} \equiv \underbrace{\frac{E P^{i}}{D P^{i}}}_{\mathrm{PTM}} \underbrace{\frac{D P^{i}}{C P I}}_{\mathrm{RPM}}
$$

- Volatility of $p_{x}^{i}$ relative to $x$ :
- Data : $80 \%$ from PTM
- Benchmark : 78\% from PTM
- Standard : 0\% from PTM
- Correlation with $x$ :
- Data
: PTM $=0.84$
$R P M=-0.14$
- Benchmark : PTM $=1.00 \quad$ RPM $=-1.00$
- Standard : PTM $=0.00 \quad$ RPM $=-1.00$


## Conclusions

- Develop a model of marketing in which customers are capital
- Promising quantitatively
- accounts for aggregate and disaggregated price dynamics
- accounts for short-run vs long-run elasticity puzzle
- maintains good fit for quantities
- international comovement of GDP vs consumption (0.40 vs 0.32 )

Backup Slides

## Volatility Ratio in the Standard Model

- Standard model adopts Armington '69 model of trade

$$
G(d, f)=\left(\omega d^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}+(1-\omega) f^{\frac{\gamma-1}{\gamma}}\right)^{\frac{\gamma}{\gamma-1}}
$$

$d$ - domestic good, $f$ - foreign good, $\gamma$ - Armington elasticity

- Step 1: demand relations: $p_{d}=G_{d}(d, f), p_{f}=G_{f}(d, f)$
- Step 2: derive from demand relations

$$
\log \left(\frac{f}{d}\right)=\gamma \log \left(\frac{p_{d}}{p_{f}}\right)+\gamma \log \left(\frac{\omega_{t}}{1-\omega_{t}}\right)
$$

- Step 3: independent $\omega$ shocks + standard deviation of both sides

$$
\sigma\left[\log \left(\frac{f}{d}\right)\right] \leq \gamma \sigma\left[\log \left(\frac{p_{d}}{p_{f}}\right)\right]
$$

## Details: Market Expansion Friction $\phi$

- Logged quarterly data 1980-2000

|  | Volatility Ratio |  |
| :--- | :--- | :--- |
| Country | HP-1600 | HP-10 |
| US | 1.23 | 1.02 |
| Canada | 1.27 | 0.64 |
| Japan | 0.60 | 0.43 |
| UK | 0.65 | 0.61 |
| $\ldots$ | $\ldots$ | $\ldots$ |
| 16 OECD median | 0.81 <br> $=\gamma$ <br> Standard Model | 0.83 <br> $=\gamma$ <br> This Model |
|  | $=0.81$ | $=1.6$ |

## Robustness

| Country | Price index used to construct $p_{x}, p_{m}, x$ |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | CPI all-items |  | CPI tradables |  | WPI or PPI |  | None (nominal) |  |
|  | $p_{x}, x$ | $p_{m}, x$ | $p_{x}, x$ | $p_{m}, x$ | $p_{x}, x$ | $p_{m}, x$ | $p_{x}, e$ | $p_{m}, e$ |
| Belgium | 0.72 | 0.74 | 0.50 | 0.54 | 0.60 | 0.41 | 0.77 | 0.76 |
| Canada | 0.50 | 0.92 | 0.53 | 0.91 | 0.52 | 0.90 | 0.20 | 0.71 |
| France | 0.61 | 0.66 | 0.46 | 0.53 | 0.57 | 0.69 | 0.71 | 0.72 |
| Germany | 0.50 | 0.85 | 0.06 | 0.76 | -0.05 | 0.88 | 0.63 | 0.80 |
| Italy | 0.68 | 0.72 | 0.61 | 0.63 | 0.59 | 0.73 | 0.62 | 0.72 |
| Japan | 0.92 | 0.85 | 0.92 | 0.87 | 0.92 | 0.87 | 0.88 | 0.76 |
| Netherlands | 0.76 | 0.80 | 0.72 | 0.78 | 0.80 | 0.82 | 0.72 | 0.76 |
| Switzerland | 0.51 | 0.83 | 0.48 | 0.82 | 0.44 | 0.88 | 0.59 | 0.80 |
| US | 0.46 | 0.69 | 0.47 | 0.70 | 0.45 | 0.79 | 0.13 | 0.44 |
| Australia | 0.45 | 0.95 | n.a | n.a | 0.50 | 0.93 | 0.35 | 0.91 |
| Sweden | 0.60 | 0.74 | n.a | n.a | 0.28 | 0.28 | 0.54 | 0.67 |
| UK | 0.61 | 0.79 | n.a | n.a | 0.41 | 0.65 | 0.34 | 0.61 |
| Median | 0.61 | 0.80 | 0.47 | 0.66 | 0.51 | 0.80 | 0.60 | 0.74 |

